By Michael Kelman Portney

When considering whether to pardon the January 6th defendants, the question isn’t just legal—it’s deeply philosophical. The debate forces us to interrogate ethics, justice, and accountability from multiple frameworks: utilitarianism, deontology, virtue ethics, and even cultural perspectives from other nations. Viewed through these lenses, pardoning those responsible for the attack on the Capitol is not only unjustified but deeply corrosive to the integrity of democratic society.

Utilitarianism: The Greatest Good for the Greatest Number

From a utilitarian perspective, any decision should maximize well-being for the greatest number of people. Pardoning the January 6th defendants undermines this principle by eroding trust in democratic institutions. The insurrection was not merely a criminal act; it was an attack on the collective stability of the United States. By allowing these individuals to escape consequences, we send a signal to future agitators that such actions bear little cost.

In nations like Germany, where history has taught the dangers of political extremism, utilitarian ethics have informed strict laws against incitement and violence targeting democracy. Pardoning January 6th participants would be unthinkable there, as it would jeopardize the public good by emboldening anti-democratic movements. The utilitarian calculus is clear: the harm of pardoning outweighs the potential benefits of reconciliation.

Deontology: Duty and Moral Absolutes

Immanuel Kant’s deontological ethics emphasize the importance of duty and universal principles. According to Kant, actions must be guided by rules that could be universally applied. If we create a precedent where political violence can be excused, we set a dangerous universal standard: "It is acceptable to disrupt democracy if you disagree with the outcome."

Deontologists argue that justice must be impartial and principled. Pardoning those who violated their duty as citizens to uphold democratic norms would betray this moral framework. Countries like South Korea, with its strict enforcement of laws against political corruption and disruption, demonstrate how deontological principles play out in practice. Violating the social contract is met with firm accountability—not clemency.

Virtue Ethics: What Would a Virtuous Leader Do?

Virtue ethics, rooted in Aristotle, focuses on cultivating moral character and societal virtues. Justice, courage, and prudence are central virtues in this framework. A leader considering pardons for January 6th participants must ask: “What action best exemplifies justice and strengthens democratic integrity?”

Pardoning these individuals would contradict the virtue of justice. It would also undermine courage, as it avoids the hard truths required to hold people accountable for their actions. In societies like Japan, where Confucian ideals emphasize the importance of harmony and respect for societal order, acts that disrupt the collective good are met with severe consequences to preserve those virtues. Leaders who grant unearned forgiveness risk fostering societal discord rather than harmony.

Cultural Perspectives: How Other Countries Would Respond

Different nations approach political violence with varying degrees of leniency, but most democratic systems recognize the necessity of accountability. In France, for example, political unrest that escalates into violence is dealt with through rigorous legal mechanisms. The Republic’s commitment to égalité (equality) ensures that no one, regardless of their political motives, is above the law.

In South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission offers an interesting counterexample, prioritizing restorative justice. However, the context there involved reconciliation after systemic apartheid—a process marked by genuine remorse and a commitment to truth-telling. The January 6th defendants have shown little of either. Restorative justice works when paired with contrition and transparency, not defiance and denial.

The Social Contract: Rousseau’s Warning

Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s concept of the social contract emphasizes that individuals give up certain freedoms in exchange for the protection and order provided by the state. The January 6th defendants shattered this contract by choosing violence over dialogue, an affront to the very fabric of democracy.

A pardon would imply that violating this contract carries no meaningful consequence, weakening the implicit agreement that holds society together. Nations like Sweden, with its high regard for social responsibility, reflect how breaches of the social contract are taken seriously to maintain societal trust and cohesion. The United States cannot afford to let this contract erode further.

Consequentialist Perspective: A Dangerous Precedent

One of the most troubling outcomes of pardoning the January 6th defendants would be the precedent it sets. From a consequentialist view, this decision doesn’t just affect the present; it shapes the future. If those who stormed the Capitol face no accountability, what stops the next group from escalating further?

History is rife with examples of leniency leading to greater instability. The leniency shown to extremists in pre-World War II Germany emboldened a movement that would ultimately dismantle the Weimar Republic. Similarly, the U.S. cannot afford to embolden those who would attack democracy under the guise of patriotism.

Final Thoughts

Philosophy is not just an abstract exercise—it’s a guide for navigating the hardest questions of justice and morality. From every ethical perspective, pardoning the January 6th defendants fails the test. It undermines trust, weakens accountability, and sets a precedent that democracy cannot afford. Other nations, informed by their own histories, would not hesitate to prosecute such acts to preserve the integrity of their systems.

Justice demands accountability, not forgiveness. To pardon these defendants would not only dishonor the principles of ethics and democracy but also invite the erosion of the very freedoms they claim to defend.